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Introduction 
This work aims to help in decision-making process 
and development of response method regarding a 
large-scale radionuclide release by a radiological 
dispersal device (RDD) and in optimizing cost 
emerging between health risks and the monetary 
impact. The HotSpot computer model was used to 
simulate a hypothetical scenario and calculate lung 
absorbed doses, which in turn are used in the BEIR 
V recommended model to estimate excess relative 
risk (ERR) of lung cancer among the potentially 
affected population [1, 2]. This forms the basis for 
proposing immediate protective actions. 
The modern world uses nuclear energy in many 
steps of its productive chain of goods and services, 
ranging from quality assurance in industrial produc-
tion to medicine and energy generation in nuclear 
power plants. This large-scale use of the nuclear 
technology requires a high level of safety. Complex 
scenarios ensue from the release of radioactive 
material into the environment that might lead to 
massive environmental exposure, severely affect-
ing a large number of individuals who would have 
to be evacuated from the risk (affected) zone. Ac-
complishing a quick and orderly evacuation would 
be an intricate and highly complex task that would 
require prompt action of well-prepared rescue teams 
and experts under the supervision of highly capable 
decision-making authorities. The core purpose of 
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this work is to study such a scenario by applying (a) 
a methodology to deal with radiological emergencies 
and (b) risk evaluation performed with converging 
independent resources for supporting decision-
-making during the early phase. The consequences 
of intense ionizing radiation regions can include 
interdiction of large areas where the access can be 
banned for relatively long periods due to the threat 
to public health. Typically, such scenarios involve 
a high degree of initial misinformation about the 
radiation source, its spatial distribution, as well 
as the possible paths of environmental transport of 
these contaminants [3, 4]. 
Usually, emergency response operations are 
compromised by a lack of initial information about 
the scenario. Therefore, once the source term is 
known, a methodology that is capable of providing 
useful basic information that positively impacts the 
ability to manage response team safety, operational 
cost-effectiveness and public health with minimum 
data available is vital for communicating risks and 
comparison with the actual data from the scenario. 
This work, through the convergence of two 
tools, helps decision-making in crisis scenarios 
facing minimal information resources. There is no 
information given on the geographical area assumed 
as this work is for a generic area. On the other side, 
there are quite good and realistic computer models 
that could be used to assess the information about 
radiation dose as a consequence of an RDD, such as 
hazard prediction and assessment capability (HPAC) 
[5]. Two approaches are considered: (a) risk model-
ing and consequence evaluation, both to the envi-
ronment and to the potentially affected population 
and (b) cost-effectiveness during the initial phase. 
A radiological scenario has been modeled in 
order to evaluate incidence risk of lung cancer to 
the potentially affected population as a function 
of time. Data from the simulations provided a fi rst 
picture of the situation, allowing immediate protec-
tive actions to be chosen. Furthermore, an estimate 
of detrimental fi nancial cost was calculated by using 
the monetary coeffi cient and the estimated collec-
tive doses [6–8]. 
Methods 
A simulation of the RDD in action, including the 
release of americium-241 (Am-241), was made. 
In the fi rst step, the HotSpot software was used 
to estimate the absorbed doses due to inhalation. 
The estimated doses were then inserted into the 
BEIR V equations for calculation of the ERR and 
the probability of causation (PC) for lung cancer 
incidence; this approach is addressed as convergence 
methodology [3]. 
The HotSpot Health Physics Code, version 3.0.3, 
developed by the American laboratory Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), is freely 
accessible and free of charge. It is often used also by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It 
was designed as a fast and portable computational 
tool in order to provide and to evaluate incidents 
involving radioactive materials. HotSpot is based 
on a conservative model to estimate the time- and 
space-dependent concentration of radionuclides 
and consequent radiation dose from release of radio-
active materials into the atmosphere [9]. The code 
uses a Gaussian model to calculate the dispersion of 
the radioactive material as it is carried by the wind 
over the impacted area, depending mainly on the 
weather conditions, characterized by the classes of 
Pasquill-Gifford [9]. 
HotSpot simulates the scenario based on the 
Gaussian plume model, which is not particularly 
accurate in urban settings; the code outputs a con-
servative picture that is convenient for a fi rst-order 
approach. Considering a more realistic model and 
comparisons with the Gaussian model, Harper 
and colleagues [10] discussed likely distribution 
of radioactivity from an RDD-type event and many 
differences between releases in urban scenarios. 
HotSpot generates an extensive set of data and 
unsophisticated graphical interpretations of output-
ted data. Thus, it greatly simplifi es the description 
of the event. The software considers the following 
parameters: (a) atmospheric dispersion model, (b) 
meteorological conditions (wind speed, stability 
class, and height of the inversion layer), (c) nature 
of the release, (d) rate of deposition, (e) explosion 
altitude, (f) explosion energy, and (e) sample and 
exposure time. Data provided include (a) total effec-
tive dose equivalent (TEDE), which corresponds to 
all doses of all the routes that the individual was ex-
posed to, (b) equivalent dose absorbed in the lungs, 
(c) ground deposition contours, and (d) gamma 
ground shine contribution. For the simulations, the 
following characteristics, shown in Table 1, were 
considered in this work. Table 1 shows the input 
data for HotSpot to perform the scenario simulation. 
In an RDD scenario, it is likely that much of the 
radioactivity will be in a particulate form that will 
deposit near the explosion site (fi rst few kilome-
ters). The fraction of breathable particles is a key 
parameter in assessing dose to the lungs, and this 
information was considered by HotSpot code. 
The epidemiological model BEIR V [11] pro-
vides means of estimating ERR and PC impairment 
for whole-body external exposure to photons (e.g. 
gamma rays). The ERR, used primarily by radiation 
epidemiologists [12], is of peculiar interest. ERR 
represents the excess risk per unit of exposure 
divided by the background risk [13]. PC, which is 
the risk of a given cancer attributable to radiation 
exposure divided by the total risk for that cancer, 
was determined from the statistical correlation be-
tween the occurrence of morbidity and exposure to 
ionizing radiation. Table 2 shows the equations used 
to calculate ERR (Eqs. (1) and (2)) for lung cancer 
incidence, PC (Eq.(3)) [9], and the detrimental cost 
equation (Eq. (4)), where r0(a,s) is the baseline rate 
taken as unit for simplifi cation purposes, a is the at-
tained age, s is the sex, t is the time since exposure 
(years), 1 = 0.636 Sv1, 1 = 1.437, 2 = 0.711, 
D is the dose (in Sv), and the risk is measured by 
ERR/Sv. The parameters 1 and 2 are the coeffi -
cients for the time after the exposure for male and 
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female, respectively. The parameter 2 (female) 
adjusts the ERR experimental curve as the relative 
risk decrease is gender dependent [11]. 
The form of the model (in particular, the time 
trend) was based on the observed patterns of lung 
cancer incidence in the UK and also on spondylitis 
data [14]. Some characteristics, such as individual 
health condition, might also increase radiosensitiv-
ity. It seems that age and gender differences may 
result in changes in the radiation exposure effects 
with increased risk for children, the elderly and 
women [15]. Additionally, International Commis-
sion on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 
103 states that women are approximately 35 percent 
more susceptible to radiation exposure than men 
[16]. Y is the detriment cost, S is the collective 
dose, and  is the monetary factor expressed by 
(US$/individual) × sievert. 
The collective dose is the sum of the individual 
doses received in a given period by a specified 
population from exposure to a specifi ed source of 
radiation. The collective dose is expressed in men-
-Sv. Since the 1980s, in quantitative optimization 
evaluations, the value of the monetary coeffi cient per 
unit of collective dose should not be lower than the 
national currency equivalent to US$ 10 000.00 per 
unit of collective dose per individual [6–8]. 
The concept of detrimental cost is defi ned as the 
cost of injury obtained per unit dose received by each 
individual or the total health damage experienced by 
an exposed group of individuals and their offspring 
as a result of exposure to a radiation source. It 
is a multidimensional concept. Its main components 
are stochastic variables such as probability of fatal or 
nonfatal cancer, hereditary effects, and potential death 
[17], and its value is obtained by means of Eq. (4). 
The ICRP Publication 22 suggests that it would 
be useful to express the collective dose assessment 
in monetary units. Thus, the advantage in reduc-
ing the collective dose can be compared directly 
against the cost needed to produce such reduction. 
Thus, the best optimization solution is the one that 
yields the lowest cost of total detriment. Examples 
of value adopted by the ICRP and some countries 
are as follows: (a) developed world: US$ 20 000.00, 
(b) Japan: US$ 25 000.00, and (c) Brazil: US$ 
10 000.00 [18]. 
Results 
The equivalent dose absorbed in the lung is repre-
sented as a function of distance from the release 
site as shown in Fig. 1. According to the adopted 
Table 1. Main input data for HotSpot 
Material Am-241
Material at risk (MAR) 7.4000E+11 Bq
Total effective equivalent dose (TEDE) TEDE  inhalation  submersion  soil deposition  resuspension
Damage ratio (DR) fraction of the MAR that is actually impacted 
in the scenario 1.000 (100%)
Fraction breathable (RF) – fraction of aerosol material that 
is breathable (aerodynamic diameter (AD)  10 microns) 0.200 (20%)
Filtration factor (LPF) is the fraction of MAR, which goes through 
some confi nement or fi ltration mechanism. For free-release 
scenarios, the leak path factor is 1 by default
1.000
Breathable material  MAR × DR × LPF × ARF × RF 1.48E+11 Bq
Non-breathable material  MAR × DR × LPF × ARF × (1-RF) 5.92E+11 Bq
Wind speed (h  10 m) 5.00 m/s
Explosive 10.00 pounds of TNT (25 kg)
Terrain Standard – produces the most conservative estimates
Table 2. Equations used to calculate ERR (Eqs. (1) and 
(2)) for incidence of lung cancer, PC (Eq. (3)), and esti-
mated cost of detriment (Eq. (4)) 
ERRM = r0(a,s)[1 + 1Dexp (1loge(t/20))], male (1)
ERRF = r0(a,s)[1 + 1Dexp (1loge(t/20) + 2],  
   female (2)
PC = [(ERR – 1)/ERR] × 100% (3)
Y = S (4)
Fig. 1. TEDE and CEDE for lungs as a function of distance 
from the release site. 
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scale, the fi rst distance 0.4 km was closest to that 
calculated by HotSpot, which is the limit where no 
mechanical or thermal effects from the explosive 
blast are felt and so radiation is the only effect. Al-
though the dose in this region as being from 1 mSv 
to 50 mSv seems excessive, the main feature for the 
fi rst-order approach is to be conservative. 
Figure 2 shows the ERR estimate considering 
radiation dose and sex of the adult population po-
tentially affected as a function of time and distance 
from the release point. 
Figure 3 shows the calculated PC results as 
a function of distance and time elapsed since the 
event. Considering that the development of the mor-
bidity occurs over longer periods, it is convenient 
to present the evolution of PC from 5 to 30 years. 
Table 3 presents the major results from the simula-
tions and mathematical models applied (see Table 2). 
Fig. 2. Excess relative risk (ERR) calculations as a function of time for (A) 0.5, (B) 1, and (C) 5 years since exposure. 
Fig. 3. Probability of causation (PC) calculations for: (A) 0.5, (B) 1, and (C) 5 years since exposure. 
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The number of inhabitants was estimated considering 
the local population density at downtown in working 
days as 10 000 inhabitants/km2 in rush hour. Even 
though such population density might impose bias 
overestimating the results, it should be considered as 
a pessimist foreseeing to serve as basis for decision. 
Discussion 
The results show that the explosion of an RDD device 
results in an increased equivalent effective total dose 
in the lungs of individuals up to a distance 50 km from 
the RDD triggering site. After this point, the radia-
tion levels are so reduced that they can be considered 
negligible and only normal background radiation is 
present. The estimated value of the equivalent dose 
in the lungs was used to estimate the ERR for lung 
cancer as a function of time. The ERR was estimated 
for a time interval from 6 months to 30 years after 
exposure to the radiation fi eld, considering only adults 
in the potentially affected population. It should be 
taken into account that the simulation is conservative. 
In a real urban setting, most people will be inside the 
buildings when the event takes place. A large building 
can reduce exposure by a factor of 20 [19]. Even for 
smaller buildings, if individuals shelter inside until the 
plume passes and then goes outside, the exposure will 
be substantially less than predicted by HotSpot codes, 
which assume everyone is outside in the open space.
Results from Fig. 1 suggest that radiation effects 
are also strongly dependent on the exact location 
(distance) of the individual in the RDD scenario 
with impact on the absorbed dose. Depending on 
the dose levels, the scenario unfolds in two zones 
of risk evaluation: (a) an inner region in which the 
ability of emergency responders could be severely 
constrained as they will be exposed to ground shine 
from deposition of particulate matter, which will 
impact their response and (b) an outer region 
where long-term public health can be affected. The 
fi rst zone runs from the RDD release site up to ap-
proximately 1 km away downwind, where the dose 
remains above 100 mSv, which is used in this work 
as the upper limit for emergency operations. A sub-
region from the release point up to approximately 
0.3 km is complex, and responders should consider 
that individuals located in this area would face 
higher radiation exposure combined with mechani-
cal and thermal impacts from the explosion. From 
the release site to 0.4 km, there is a rapid decrease 
in ERR, while from 0.4 km to 0.9 km, the dose re-
duction is relatively small. Across this fi rst zone out 
to 1 km, responders should include the possibility 
of immediate biological effects occurrence such 
as acute radiation syndrome, which is extensively 
described by Mettler [20]. Within this 1 km zone, 
females are signifi cantly more likely (up to twice as 
likely) to get a lung cancer within ten years of the 
exposure. The male and female incidences of cancer 
become similar over longer time periods of about 
5 years following the exposure. 
In the second zone beyond 1 km, the dose is 
estimated below the 100 mSv emergency responder 
limit. Data shown in Fig. 1 for individuals beyond 
1 km downwind still show some elevated level of 
ERR near term, especially for females. This fi nding 
may suggest that it may be diffi cult to check for new 
cases of lung cancer later on among those located 
beyond 1 km, not only because of risen risk but also 
because of poor statistics normally faced in such 
scenarios. This might infl uence positively the cost-
-effectiveness level. 
The data calculated for PC presented in Fig. 3 
also suggest that female individuals are under a 
higher chance of correlation between the develop-
ment of morbidity and the exposure when com-
pared to male ones. This trend points to the strong 
dependency of time, with the differences between 
genders decreasing with time elapsed since exposure. 
Time negatively affects the correlation between the 
development of the morbidity and the previous 
radiological exposure. 
Table 3 presents, in a concise form, data that 
could be used in and support a decision-making. The 
data presented are as follows: (a) size of potentially 
affected population, (b) collective dose, (c) approxi-
mate detriment cost, and (d) total effective equivalent 
dose. Such data give an overview of the situation and 
offer the opportunity to streamline the logistics activi-
ties and to allocate resources. Results presented in 
Table 3 suggest that there is a potential increasing 
demand of such resources as the distance to which 
response and recovery measures from the RDD re-
lease are to be implemented. This is dominated by 
the increasing size of the population accounted for. 
Considering radiation dose distribution within 
the plume, protective measures may have a positive 
fi nancial impact. In such situations, prompt and pre-
cise decisions are necessary and may include urgent 
measures such as (a) sheltering and (b) evacuation. 
These measures are supported by an assessment of 
the external exposure conditions and inhalation 
doses of the population [21, 22]. 
Table 3. Major results from simulations based on equations listed in Table 2. Lethal dose (LD50/30) is the radiation dose 
that causes 50% of the exposed population to die within 30 days following the exposure 
Location (L) Individuals Collective dose [Sv] Cost detriment [US$] TEDE [mSv]
9.6 Sv (10 m) Dose  LD50/30 (4 × 103 mSv) 4 Sv (30 m)
1.5 Sv (274 m) Radiation and/or injuries from blasting (combined injuries)
274 m < L < 1.4 km        5 485 3.08E+03   30 768 830.40 50 < D <1001.4 km < L < 2.4 km      14 691 9.99E+02     9 989 880.00
2.4 km < L < 50 km 3 036 140 4.65E+04 465 288 455.00 1  D  50
L > 50 km Background
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The data generated from simulation and calcula-
tions, which are shown in Table 3, can contribute to 
and support the planning of countermeasures as they 
provide a brief overview of the scale considering the 
efforts to be made in order to provide evacuation and 
sheltering. 
Additionally, the cost of detriment is dependent on 
the location of individuals. Table 3 lists estimates of 
fi nancial resources to be allocated for the scenario into 
two categories, depending on the radiation dose, re-
gardless of accounting the cost of emergency response, 
or decontamination: (a) 50 mSv  D  100 mSv 
( US$ 40 Mi) and (b) 1 mSv  D  50 mSv (US$ 
500 Mi). For these ranges, in accordance with interna-
tional or local standards, the allocation of resources’ 
assessment is performed in order to determine the 
cost amount to be destined. 
Conclusion 
This work has demonstrated that a typical RDD 
event can lead to serious adverse effects to a 
population. In addition, the results suggest that 
scientifi c information promptly obtained through 
convergence methodology requiring limited input 
data may produce a positive impact regarding cost 
and emergency planning activities when support-
ing the decision-making process. In this way, the 
proposed methodology offers usable data that could 
facilitate the decision-making process during such 
emergencies by promptly providing some important 
quantitative aspects. 
Such aspects can be (a) an estimate of the po-
tentially affected population size; (b) an overview 
of the scenario that would help choose the best 
protection measures; (c) a prioritization of activities 
of responders and evacuees according to gender; 
(d) an estimate of TEDE and committed effective 
dose equivalent (CEDE) doses, which are the core 
variables; (e) generate a matrix of incidence for lung 
cancer within a period of 30 years; and (f) estimate 
costs of detriment, considering the initial conditions 
and the operational capacity of authorities for real-
location of resources when necessary. 
The potentially affected population is subject to 
exposure, and resources should be properly managed 
over time in support of both the attendance to poten-
tial developments of morbidities related to the event. 
Consequently, in this way, the results from this work 
might contribute by advising the authorities to seek 
for further resources in the long-term perspective. 
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